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The World Debt Crisis: Working Out Solutions 
1985 Free Market Calendar 
A Daily Chronicle Of Enterprise 
In a joint venture project with Louver Manufacturing 
Company (Lomanco) of Jacksonville, Arkansas, the 
Harding University Students in Free Enterprise 
Economics Team has launched a major six months 
project: "The 1985 FREE MARKET CALENDAR - A 
Daily Chronicle of Enterprise." 
A calendar is a record of days past and days to come. 
Since the ancient Egyptians first devised calendars to 
tabulate the inexorable passage of time, men's lives have 
been regulated by its pages. Each day, each month is a 
milestone in the passage from youth to old age. Each 
week holds its promise of struggle and reward, of ideas 
achieved and triumphs won. But more than this, the 
FREE MARKET CALENDAR is the record of the 
progress of our nation and its people, of mankind's 
onward march through the centuries to economic 
freedom and greater material blessings. 
The 1985 FREE MARKET CALENDAR offers not 
only room to jot down notes of daily affairs but also 365 
brief reminders of great enterprising events and relevant 
comments on the idea of freedom applied to the 
marketplace. One will enjoy recalling and com· 
memorating the stirring events, and the great men and 
ideas behind them, which have been the basis for 
history's greatest economic miracle - American 
Capitalism. 
Printed in blue and red ink on which stock, the 1985 
FREE MARKET CALENDAR is punched for hanging 
aild measures 11" x 14" folded or 22" x 14" unfolded. 
The National Federation for Independent Business 
(NFIB) has been reprinting portions of our calendar in 
their FORUM and INSIGHT publications. A limited 
amount of copies are available for St.SO to cover prin-
ting, postage, handling costs. 
by James B. Burnham 
I would like to start with a quotation that I find 
helpful in understanding the general issue of in-
ternational debt and the immediate problem facing us. It 
is from a World Bank Annual Report, and it reads as 
follows: 
It must not be forgotten that if there was bad 
borrowing ... there was also bad lending. And there 
was also reckless competition, encouragement was 
sometimes given to borrowers and lenders alike 
without sufficient understanding of what was in-
volved; loans were often made for unproductive 
purposes; sufficient care was not always exercised to 
see that a loan was used for the purpose for which it 
was granted; and high interest rates, instead of en-
couraging investors to inquire into the likelihood that 
the borrower could meet his obligations, failed to do 
anything but encourage them to invest their money. It 
is important that there should be in the future a 
greater sense of responsibility both in borrowing and 
lending than has frequently been the case in the past. 
As I mentioned, the quotation is from a World Bank 
Annual Report: the date is 1947. What was being 
discussed was the legacy of over-borrowing and over-
lending that had taken place in the 1920s, actions which 
subsequently imposed tremendous burdens on the 
developing world as well as on parts of Eastern Europe. 
In the 1940s and 1950s the World Bank was striving to 
reestablish the credit-worthiness of the developing 
countries, mainly in Latin America. That is what, in 
large measure, we are trying to do today as well. What we 
are going through now, therefore, is not an un-
precedented situation. And it could be that some of the 
lessons we are supposed to learn today are the same ones 
that should have been learned more than fifty years ago. 
Let me start with a capsule analysis of how we got to 
today's situation. The world credit crisis is a legacy of the 
inflation of the 1970s, an inflation that encouraged over-
borrowing and over-lending. It is not just a question of 
over-borrowing in the case of developing countries, but 
also over-borrowing for energy development or for real 
estate in the developed countries as well. Indeed, I think 
write-offs of such domestic lending are going to exceed 
what is likely to take place in terms of international 
loans. The basic point is that double-digit inflation and 
negative real interest rates in the 1970s led to over-
leveraged balance sheets for everyone - whether it was 
individuals, businesses, or entire countries. Today we are 
struggling to readjust everyone's balance sheets to a new 
reality, the reality of lower inflation and lower ex-
pectations about the future rate of price increases. 
AVOIDING A GREAT-DEPRESSION-STYLE 
FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 
If the situation today is, in some respects, similar to 
the 1930s and 1940s, do we need a Great Depression to 
work our way out of the problem? Fortunately, the 
answer is "no." We did learn something from the 1930s. 
The policies developed to address current debt problems 
fully recognize that we cannot afford a contraction of 
money and credit - and the resulting deflation - such 
as took place in the 1930s. 
International Cooperation 
For example, we have seen extraordinary examples of 
assistance by the major finance ministries and central 
banks around the world to indebted countries, combined 
with repeated instances of cooperative efforts by com-
mercial financial institutions. It sort of reminds me of 
the old "Tinker-to-Evers-to-Chance" double-play 
combination of the Chicago Cubs. Of course, every 
situation we have encountered is different in some 
respects. Hungary experienced the first major in-
ternational debt-liquidity problem, although most 
people did not notice it at the time. (I put Poland in a 
somewhat different category.) In the case of Hungary, 
the problem was precipitated by withdrawal of short-
term foreign deposits in the Hungarian central bank, 
followed by a threat of imminent default. The Bank for 
International Settlements, the central banker's bank, 
stepped into the breach, followed by some other central 
banks, and thus default of the Hungarian external debt 
was averted. 
Next, we had a Yugoslav crisis that was somewhat 
similar. It was, in turn, followed by the Mexican crisis 
which required a different type of solution. The U.S. 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve were very intimately 
involved in averting a Mexican default. We have now 
moved on to Brazil and Argentina. We will also have 
"work out" situations in Nigeria and the Philippines that 
are going to be difficult and complex. Nonetheless, we 
have an interlocking network of cooperation between the 
central banks, the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank (to a limited extent), the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements and, most importantly of all, the 
commercial banks. 
The Effects of Economic Recovery 
The second factor that I believe makes a repeat of our 
experience in the 1930s unlikely is the very strong, broad, 
and deep recovery in the United States. By now, nearly 
all of us have experienced some impact of the high rate of 
growth in the domestic economy. But from the 
developing countries' point of view, the most important 
aspect of this recovering is the tremendous increase in 
U.S. imports that is taking place. In 1982, the U.S. ran a 
slight surplus on its trade account with the non-oil, 
developing countries - a little under S2 billion. In 1983, 
we ran a deficit of about $12 billion with those same 
countries. Thus, the swing in terms of foreign exchange 
earnings for those countries was roughly $14 billion. 
That massive swing in and of itself is one of the most 
powerful factors in getting the international banking 
system and the economies of developing countries back 
into a healthier, more sustainable posture. 
Some Pain is Part of the Cure 
Let me next discuss some of the policy adjustments 
that the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank have required in these "workout" situations. I 
believe that the IMF and the World Bank have received a 
bad rap for asking these countries to adopt policies -
exchange rate devaluations, budget restraint, credit 
growth limitations, and the like - that are supposedly 
unduly harsh. The question is, "What is the alter-
native?" There really is no alternative to requiring these 
countries to put their economic houses in order, because 
if they do not do so today, they will have to do it twelve or 
eighteen months from now. Delay will only make the 
pain more intense. 
On the positive side, I believe that the boat is being 
righted in some of these countries. If you look at Eastern 
Europe today, the economic growth and credit-
worthiness of a country such as Hungary has 
significantly improved compared to the situation 
eighteen months or two years ago. In the case of Mexico, 
you can detect a sense of confidence returning to the 
banking system, even though we recognize there is going 
to be a medium-term rescheduling problem in that 
nation (and elsewhere). Confidence in the system is 
rebuilding. 
Ad Hoc Solutions versus "Silver Bullets" 
As I indicated, there are a lot of players in this current 
financial situation. The International Monetary Fund is 
the most visible and essential player. All parties look to 
the IMF to provide a degree of coordination in any given 
debt crisis. But the commercial banks are clearly a key 
ingredient in this process as well. By and large, their 
response has been quite positive. It has not always been 
easy. But the fact is, we are seeing a joint sharing of the 
costs of adjustment by the developing countries them-
selves, the commercial banks, the IMF, and indeed, the 
central banks of some of the countries involved. The 
whole exercise is an attempt to distribute the cost of 
adjustment. Each case is unique; each requires a dif-
ferent combination of measures, a different formula for 
burden-sharing that has to be worked out. The process is 
"ad hoc but not disorderly," although it may appear to 
be so from the outside. 
Some people have pet schemes for what I call magic 
"silver bullets." For example, they want the World Bank 
to buy up the developing countries' debt and give the 
commercial banks some type of paper in exchange. That, 
to my mind, is the old approach of papering your way out 
of the problem. I do not support that type of solution. 
Fortunately, there seems to be less and less talk of ·that 
type of "quick fix" today than there was a year ago. 
Furthermore, I believe it would be a great mistake to try 
to set up a new institution or a new financial instrument 
to solve these problems. Any attempt to do so runs the 
very real risk of only making the problem worse, as the 
parties concerned "rest on their oars," waiting for a 
Sugar Daddy to come along. 
WORLD TRADE AND mE DEBT CRISIS 
Protectionism and Debt 
Repayment are hicompatible 
It is highly relevant to say a few words about the trade 
aspects of world debt problems. The recovery in the 
United States a\ld our tremendous demand for imports 
from abroad are very powerful positive factors in 
working our way out of this situation. I believe genuinely 
open trade is one of the most difficult issues facing us 
today. People's attitudes about the benefits of freer trade 
depend upon how it affects them - whether one is an 
exporter, an importer, a consumer, a banker, or someone 
facing competition from foreign suppliers. One of my 
biggest complaints is that U.S. government trade 
promotion policies seem to be concerned only with 
exports. Certainly, exports are a very important part of 
the general international economic system. In fact, as 
U.S. Executive Director at World Bank, I actively en-
courage American firms to bid on World Bank projects. 
But what about imports? Unless we import from the 
developing countries, they will not have the dollars to pay 
for our exports. Trade is a two-way street. 
In general, funds are provided to nations either 
through trade by importing, with the result that foreign 
countries earn the dollars they need to buy our exports -
or it is done through foreign aid, by having Congress 
appropriate money and lift it out of the pockets of 
taxpayers. Most of us would agree that the preferable 
situation is to have a voluntary, two-way process and not 
to rely on foreign aid. Protectionism makes it difficult for 
our trading partners to pay for our exports. As Murray 
Weidenbaum and his associates at the Center for the 
Study of American Business have shown, protectionist 
interference with imports also imposes a large cost on the 
American economy and the American consumer. In 
1980, this cost was about $58 billion a year and was 
passed on to consumers in the form of a "hidden tax" 
included in the price of American goods and services. 
In this regard, one of the things that the World Bank 
is trying to do in working with developing countries is to 
persuade them to adopt policies that liberalize their 
import regimes and that do not discriminate against 
imports of capital goods or raw materials coming from 
abroad. In particular, we encourage fewer restrictions on 
imports for those nations which need imported inputs for 
their exports, in order to get the two-way street of trade 
flowing more rapidly. The World Bank is making major 
efforts in this regard, both in terms of its lending 
program and in terms of the policy advice given to these 
countries. But that process will not work if the United 
States increases its barriers to imports from abroad. 
Bilateral Blinders 
I am also concerned that we have a tendency in the 
U.S. to look at trade issues bilaterally. At a time such as 
the present, when we are running a large trade deficit, we 
tend to focus on the balance of trade with specific 
countries, such as Brazil or Japan. If we do not like the 
Japanese inroads into our economy, we go after the 
Japanese. This is what I call "creeping bilateralism." 
One of the great dangers in this approach to world trade 
is that it involves the U.S. government more and more in 
the commercial details of bilateral trade relationships. 
We should leave such details to the private parties in-
volved. 
The alternative is the long-standing approach of 
addressing trade issues on a multilateral basis. Large, 
complex multilateral negotiations such as those con-
ducted within the General Agreements on Tariffs and 
Trade take a lot of time, of course. But they reduce the 
potential for mischief that is inherent in bilateral 
negotiations. Japan may be a special case, since.there are 
some peculiar problems . involved in dealing with the 
Japanese. Nevertheless, our basic ·objective should be to 
draw the Japanese into a speedy, productive set of 
multilateral negotiations. Negotiating meaningful 
multilateral trade agreements is one of the major 
challenges in international economic policy facing us in 
the months and years ahead. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me conclude by· summarizing the current 
situation. We have an economic recovery underway in 
the U.S. that is strong and deep. The estimates for 
economic growth in 1984 have been continually revised 
upward over the last quarter of 1983 and the first quarter 
of this year. The Japanese recovery is also strengthening. 
The recovery in the United Kingdom, although weak, 
has also strengthened somewhat. An improved world-
wide economy is certainly a necessary part of working 
our way out of the international debt situation. 
It is also clear that economic growth is increasing in a 
number of the developing countries. We tend to think 
that all developing countries are in the same shape as 
some , of the poorer performing African ~onomies. 
However, even in Africa, there are countries that do 
fairly well. Botswana, in southern Africa, has a fairly 
successful record. It has an open economy, and it has 
been blessed with some great mineral resources - but so 
have a number of other African countries. The secret of 
Botswana's success is that it has encouraged foreign 
investment and human capital to come in and cooperate 
with the local authorities. 
China is another interesting case. Chinese economic 
growth has been extraordinary over the last several years. 
That n~tion's foreign exchange reserves are now well 
over $10 billion, and the country is running a substantial 
trade surplus. China's progress is not the result of 
massive amounts of foreign aid - it has received 
practically no aid - but it has adopted market-oriented 
policies that are encouraging individuals to work, to 
save, and to invest. India also has had a very strong 
economy over the last three or four years and will con-
tinue to be in good shape. Pakistan has made fairly good 
progress in recent years, mainly as a result of adopting 
good economic policy. 
Still, complex problems persist. The debt situation for 
countries such as Nigeria and the Philippines is going to 
be difficult to work out. But I believe we have good 
examples to guide the parties involved. The challenge 
now is to avoid creating once again the economic con-
ditions which led to the present international debt crisis. 
We must avoid the inflation that arises from excessively 
easy monetary policies: there must be a continuing 
resolve by our public policymakers around the world to 
keep inflation under control. I believe that restraining 
inflation is the single most important key to avoiding the 
conditions that could lead to another international debt 
crisis - and for preventing the 1984 World Bank An-
nual Report from being quoted fifteen years from now in 
the same spirit and tone in which I cited the 1947 edition. 
James B. Burnham is the U .. S. Executive.Director at the World 
Bank in Washington, D.C. This report was originally published 
in June 1984 by the Center for the Study of American Business 
at Washington University in St. Louis. 
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